North Dakota Law Review
Volume 56

Number 1

Article 1

1979

Arbitration of Claims of Contract Unconscionability
George Goldberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Goldberg, George (1979) "Arbitration of Claims of Contract Unconscionability," North Dakota Law Review:
Vol. 56 : No. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol56/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

ARBITRATION OF CLAIMS
OF CONTRACT UNCONSCIONABILITY

GEORGE GOLDBERG*

SYNOPSIS
Q: There is a strong public policy against enforcement of
unconscionable contracts and contractual provisions. There is a
strong public policy favoring arbitrability of commercial disputes.
Should a party to a contract providing for arbitration of all disputes
arising out of the contract or relating thereto be compelled to
arbitrate a claim that the contract or any provision thereof is
unconscionable?
A: If the parties knowingly and willingly agreed to arbitrate
any dispute arising out of or relating to their contract, any claim
that the contract or any provision thereof is unconscionable should
be determined by the arbitrators and not the courts.
PREFACE
In 1969 the New York Court of Appeals unanimously held
that an arbitrator has the power, analogous to the power of a court
acting pursuant to U.C.C. §2-302, to decline to enforce a provision
he deems unconscionable even though that provision is contained
in the contract from which he derives his jurisdiction. 1 Indeed,
while the majority of four judges held that in such circumstances
the arbitrator must indicate in his award that he has deliberately
LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1959. Member of the Bars of the State of New York and the
District of Columbia. Author of, inter alia, A Lawyer's Guide to ComnercialArbitration (American Law
Institute 1977).
1. Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. AaronsonCowen, Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d451,255 N.E.2d 168, 171,
306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 939 (1969).
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ignored a contractual provision on grounds of unconscionability,
the three-judge mihority thought that even that requirement
constituted unwarranted interference with the arbitrator's
authority.
This decision seemed consistent with a general trend of
increasing judicial hospitality towards arbitration of commercial
disputes. Thus, only two years earlier the United States Supreme
Court had held that where a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, all
other issues, even a claim that the contract containing the
arbitration clause (but not the arbitration clause itself) was induced
2
by fraud, are for the arbitrators to determine.
On August 16, 1978, however, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that where a party to a contract
claims that one of its clauses is unconscionable, the court must first
receive evidence and determine the issue of unconscionability
before it can give effect to the arbitration clause contained in the
contract. 3 This decision naturally caused wide consternation within
the arbitration bar, since it seemed to signal a possible return to an
earlier age marked by judicial hostility to arbitration. This concern
was heightened by the fact that only one month earlier the New
York Court of Appeals, the highest court of the state which has
traditionally been most hospitable to arbitration, rendered a
decision holding that "the inclusion of an arbitration agreement
materially alters a contract for the sale of goods, and thus, pursuant
to [U.C.C.] Section 2-207(2)(b), it will not become a part of such a
contract unless both parties explicitly agree to it. ",4 It seemed as if
the Dark Ages were about to return.
The New York Court of Appeals "material alteration"
decision has in fact had a widespread and deleterious effect on
arbitration practice, compelling many parties to go to court with
disputes which had theretofore been arbitrable. 5 The Second
Circuit opinion cited above has not had a similar effect for the
reason that on July 19, 1979, the Second Circuit had second
thoughts and, on reargument, reversed and held (2-1) that the issue
of unconscionability should be sent to the arbitrators. 6 The
majority adopted the procedure which had been mandated by the
2. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967). The New York
Court of Appeals brought New York into line with this principle in Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d
190, 298 N.E.2d 42, 47, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848, ?55-56 (1973). Accord, Stateside Machinery Co., Ltd. v.
Alperin, 591 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1979).
3. Farkar Co. v. R.A. Hanson Disc, Ltd., 583 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1978).
4. Marlene Indtjs. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 333, 380 N.E.2d 239, 242,
408 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (1978).
5. See Houston, A Barrierto Arbitration in the Textile Industry, 34 Arb. j. 9 (1979).
6. Farkar Co.v. R. A. Hanson Disc, Ltd., 604 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1979).
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New York Court of Appeals in 1969 and instructed the District
Court to "direct the arbitrators to be bound by the limitation of
damages provision unless in a separate determination expressed in
the award they find the provision to be unconscionable within the
meaning of U.C.C. §2-302, 2-719."1 Circuit judge Moore would
not even go that far and strongly dissented on the ground that
U.C.C. § 2-302 commences: "if the court as a matter of law
finds ..
."' Judge Moore also noted that "[b]efore a contract is
submitted to arbitration the nature and the extent of the contract
must be known. These cases are uniform in holding that this
determination must be made by the court. "9
As the synopsis of this article suggests, it is here submitted that
the New York Court of Appeals in 1969 was correct in holding that
a claim of unconscionability should be determined by the
arbitrators appointed under a broad arbitration clause and that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct
in 1979 in reconsidering and reversing its 1978 decision.
I. THE PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST ENFORCEMENT OF
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS
A.

COMMON LAW BACKGROUND

At common law, notwithstanding universal support for
"freedom of contract," courts sometimes found ways of declining
to enforce contracts which were so onesided as to "offend the
conscience." Inadequacy of consideration was naturally the most
obvious indication of unfairness, but the courts usually required
some additional element showing unfair dealing by a party with
overwhelming strength on one side against a party suffering from
debilitating weakness on the other. For example, during the first
generation of our independent jurisprudence Chancellor Kent, one
of the greatest of our legal theoreticians, held "[t]here is no case
where mere inadequacy of price, independent of other
circumstances, has been held sufficient to set aside a sale made
between parties standing on equal ground, and dealing with each
other without any imposition or oppression." 10
A century and a quarter later the fifth edition of Pomeroy's
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 3.

9. Id.
10. Osgood v. Franklin, 2.1ohns. Ch. 1,23 (new York 1816), aff'd. 14 lohns. 527 (1817).
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classic EoUITY
formulation:

JURISPRUDENCE

merely elaborated upon Kent's

If there is nothing but mere inadequacy of price, the case
must be extreme, in order to call for the interposition of
equity.

.

.

.

When the accompanying incidents

are

inequitable and show bad faith, such as concealments,
misrepresentations, undue advantage, oppression on the
part of the one who obtains the benefit, or ignorance,
weakness of mind, sickness, old age, incapacity,
pecuniary necessities, and the like, on the part of the
other, these circumstances, combined with inadequacy of
price, may easily induce a court to grant relief, defensive
or affirmative. 1 '
By these formulations, two elements must be present before a
court will relieve a party from his contractual commitments: (1)
gross inadequacy of consideration and (2) unfairness in dealing.
The first element, which has been called "substantive
unconscionability," did not suffice without the presence also of the
second element, "procedural unconscionability."1 2 The New York
Court of Appeals in this regard has held as follows:
Ordinarily, the signer of a deed or other instrument,
expressive of a jural act, is conclusively bound thereby.
That his mind never gave assent to the terms expressed is
not material [citation omitted]. If the signer could read
the instrument, not to have read it was gross negligence;
if he could not read it, not to procure it to be read was
equally negligent; in either case the writing binds him...
[However,] [ilf the signer is illiterate, or blind, or
ignorant of the alien language of the writing, and the
contents thereof are misread or misrepresented to him by
the other party, or even by a stranger, unless the signer be
3
negligent, the writing is void.'
Examples of similar statements by the most impressive
authorites could be multiplied almost without end. But in fact, it
was always the inadequacy of consideration which shocked the
9

11. C. POMEROY. E',_'ITYJt'RISPRLDENCE 02 8 at 639-42 & nn. 1-3 (5th ed. 1941).
12. See. e.g.. Christianson Bros.. Inc. v. State of Washington. 90 Wash.2d 782, 586 P.2d 840
(1978): Schroeder v. Fageol Motors. Inc.. 86 Wash.2d 256. 544 P.2d 20(1975).
13. Pimrn nello v. Swift & Co., 253 N.Y. 159, 162-63, 170 N.E. 530. 531 (19:0).
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conscience of a court willing to relieve a party of his contractual
commitments. After all, if the price were fair, the inequality of the
parties' bargaining position would not matter. By the same token,

if the price were grossly disproportionate to the thing being
exchanged, why should the apparent positions of the parties
matter? At civil law, indeed, there developed a doctrine called laesio
enormis whereby a party could rescind a contract which gave him
less than half of the value of his property being exchanged. 14
At common law, however, "freedom of contract" was
accorded great rhetorical respect. Therefore, a court could not
decline to enforce a contract "merely" because it was grossly
unfair. There had to be some additional element, some aspect of
procedural unfairness, of bad faith in dealing. In practice, this put
a great premium on judicial creativity, what Karl Llewellyn called
"intentional

and

creative

misconstruction.'

115

The

result,

according to Llewellyn, was that the courts failed to:
face the issue, they fail[ed] to accumulate either
experience or authority in the needed direction: that of

marking out for any given type of transaction what the
minimum decencies are which a court will insist upon as
essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type, or as
16
being inherent in a bargain of that type.

The author of a recent treatise on the Uniform Commercial
Code stated that "[f]or better or for worse, the court loath to limit
the exercise of freedom [of contract] directly did so by engaging in a
dangerous word game to achieve the same result. The objective was

laudable; the method of achieving it, deplorable." 7 A good
example of this practice is the leading modern pre-Code case,
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz. 18 It is cited in every discussion of the
pre-Code doctrine of unconscionability for the proposition that
more than mere inadequacy of consideration was necessary. But in
fact, notwithstanding what the Campbell court said, nothing but
inadequacy of consideration was present.
The defendant-farmer had sold to Campbell his entire crop of
a certain type of carrots for future delivery. The contract price was
14. See, Dawson, Economic Duress and theFairExchange inFrench & German Law, 11 TUL. L. REV.
345, 364-70 (1937).
15. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
16. Id.
17. I. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY & LAW DIGEST 2-96 (1978).
18. 172 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir. 1948).
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$30 a ton but at the time delivery was due the market price had
risen to $90 a ton. The farmer thereupon sold the carrots to
someone else and Campbell sued for specific performance. The
court agreed that Campbell was entitled to equitable relief (it found
that Campbell needed the carrots and that they were unobtainable
in the market) except for one thing - "the sum total of its provisions
[referring to the contract between the parties, which was on
Campbell's standard printed form] drives too hard a bargain for a
court of conscience to assist."

19

But the "hard" provisions cited by the court, such as one
restricting the farmer's disposition of carrots which might be
rejected by Campbell's, had nothing to do with the case, which
involved nothing more than one party's refusal to deliver goods for
an agreed price after the market for that commodity had risen
substantially above what it had been on the day of contracting. The
court did not even find that the price was unreasonable when the
contract was entered into. Nor did it condone the farmer's breach.
Nevertheless, the court held as follows:
We are not suggesting that the contract is illegal.
Nor are we suggesting any excuse for the grower in this
case who has deliberately broken an agreement entered
into with Campbell. We do think, however, that a party
who has offered and succeeded in getting an agreement as
tough as this one is, should not come to a chancellor and
ask court help in the enforcement of its terms. That equity
does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well
established to require elaborate citation. 2 0
It seems clear that the conscience of the Campbell court was
shocked by the inadequacy of the consideration (one-third of the
actual value of the goods being exchanged) but felt obliged to
indulge in "creative misconstruction" to satisfy the judicial
proprieties.
B.

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

According to a New York appellate court "the conclusion is
inescapable that the Uniform Commercial Code [§2-302] simply
codified the doctrine [of unconscionability], which was used by the
19. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 84 (3rd Cir. 1948).
20. Id. at 83.
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commonlaw courts to invalidate contracts under certain
circumstances."'" That was very true. Moreover, the drafters of
the Code cut through the rhetoric of the judicial doctrine of
unconscionability and focused on what the courts actually did. Thus
the drafters of the Code virtually ignored procedural unconscionability and made the only test the fairness of the bargain itself. Indeed, procedural unconscionability is not even mentioned in
U.C.C. §2-302, which provides in full as follows:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at
the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid an
unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that
the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable
the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Nevertheless, the courts continued to talk about unequal
bargaining power, unfair dealing, and the like. A comparison of a
case decided immediately prior to passage of the U.C.C. with two
cases decided after adoption of the U.C.C., is revealing. In
Williams v. Walker- Thomas FurnitureCo., 22 the plaintiff-customer was
a woman on relief, separated from her husband, with seven
children. The retailer-defendant belonged to that all too numerous
species known as the common ghetto parasite. Mrs. Williams had
purchased and paid for a considerable quantity of furniture over
several years but when she defaulted on a payment for a stereo set,
the store took everything back under an add-on provision in the sales
contract for the stereo set. The trial court expressed its
condemnation of the store's conduct but thought that it had no
power to refuse to enforce even "such exploitative contracts." ' 23
The Circuit Court disagreed and held the following:
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence
21. Matter ofFriedman, 64 A.D.2d 70, 84, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1007 (1978).
22. 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964), remanded, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964),
remanded, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable
contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is
hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective
manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the
terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the
agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned
and the court should consider whether the terms of the
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be
24
withheld.
In Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso,25 decided less than two years
after the U.C.C. became effective in New York, the court declined
to enforce a retail installment contract requiring the purchaser to
pay a total of $1,145.88 for a refrigerator which had cost the dealer
$348.00, where the customer spoke only Spanish and was tricked
into signing an English-language contract by a Spanish-speaking
salesman. 26 Similarly, in Jones v. Star Credit Corp. 27 the court held
that an installment sales contract calling for payment of a total of
$1,439.69 for a freezer having a maximum retail value of $300.00
was unconscionable where the purchasers were welfare recipients
who had already paid $619.88 for the $300.00 freezer. The court
held the following:
On the one hand it is necessary to recognize the
importance of preserving the integrity of agreements and
the fundamental right of parties to deal, trade, bargain,
and contract. On the other hand there is the concern for
the uneducated and often illiterate individual who is the
24. 350 F.2d at 449-50. Before the circuit court rendered its decision, Congress passed the
U.C.C. for the District of Columbia. However, the circuit court held that the common law was
adequate to the task and enunciated the applicable common law principles in the language quoted
above. Id. at 448-49.
25. 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc.2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967).
26. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'don other grounds,
54 Misc.2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967). The trial court gave the dealer only $348 but its decision
was modified to add reasonable profit and freight and finance charges, 54 Misc.2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967). See also, Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc.2d 948, 371
N.Y.S.2d 289 (Civil Ct. 1975); Graziano v. Tortora Agency, Inc., 78 Misc.2d 1094, 359 N.Y.S.2d
489 (Civil Ct. 1974); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647, 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Civil Ct.
1974); Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 67 Misc.2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civil Ct. 1971);
Milford Finance Corp. v. Lucas, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 801 (Mass. App. Div. 1970). Cf, Johnson v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (a "practically illiterate" party was permitted to
avoid a contractual exclusion of consequential damages, even though he had never advised Mobil
that he couldn't read). In reaching this decision the court took note of Mobil's "immense bargaining
power." Id. at 269.
27. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Suo. Ct. 1969).
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victim of gross inequality of bargaining power, usually
28
the poorest members of the community.

But was the status and condition of the disadvantaged party
really necessary to the decision in any of these three cases - the one
decided without benefit of.UCC § 2-302 -and the two with? Are not
the courts really holding only that a gross discrepancy in the value
of things exchanged creates a presumption of unfair dealing and-or
unequal bargaining power? The Surrogate of New York County
was surely correct when he noted the following:
The courts do, however, look to the adequacy of the
consideration in order to determine whether the bargain
provided for is grossly unreasonable or unconscionable
[citation omitted]. Thus, where inequality of the bargain
is so gross there is an inference that it was in some way
improperly obtained and is unconscionable [citations
omitted] .29
C.

APPLICABILITY TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

The cases mentioned above involved retail consumer
transactions where the retailer was in effect charged with quasifiduciary obligations to his customers. 30 This of course raises a
different issue - indeed, virtually a diametrically opposite issue from a commercial transaction between business entities
28..Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 190, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 265. (Sup. Ct. 1969).
Seealso Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, (1977);
Christiansen Bro., Inc. v. State of Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 872, 586 P.2d 840 (1978); Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247
A.2d 701 (Law Div. 1968); aff'd, 108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1970); Toker v.Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (Dist. Ct. 1970); Walsh v. Ford Motors Co., 59
Misc. 2d 241, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d
620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civil Ct. 1967); Electronics Corp. ofAmerica v. LearJet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d
1066, 286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1967). Cf MatterofAnna D., N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1979, at 11, col.
2 [not officially reportedi (New York City Family Court) where the Department of Social Services
sought to transfer the custody and care ofa minor child under a "Volhntary Placement Agreement"
written in the English language and signed by parents who read only Italian. Moreover, to the extent
that a department agent attempted to explain the effect of the document to the parties (in English, the
agent spoke no Italian) the court found that her explanations were probably misleading. Under these
circumstances, the court held that no binding contract existed.
29. In Re Estate ofVought, 70 Misc. 2d 781, 788, 334 N.Y.S.2d 720, 728 (Surr. Ct. 1972. But
see Mandel v. Liebman, 303 N.Y. 88, 100 N.E.2d 149 (1951).
30. (Cf State of New York v. ITM. Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39. 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966)
where the state succeeded in enjoining retailers from selling appliances at unconscionable prices and
by deceptive means. See also M. BENFIELo, NEW APPROACHES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1970) and
the burgeoning materials on consumer law. It will be recalled that Dante assigned violators of
fidtuciarv obligations to the lowest circle ofhis Inferno.
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presumably dealing at arms length. But the courts also apply the
unconscionability doctrine to commercial transactions.
3
For example, in Electronics Corp. of America v. Lear Jet Corp. 1
Lear's local distributor sold an aircraft to Chandler Leasing Corp.,
which financed the purchase by mortgaging the aircraft to an
insurance company and also assigning to the insurance company
the lease between Chandler and plaintiff. The aircraft did not work
and the plaintiff returned it to Lear, which retained possession. The
lease contained an express exclusion of all warranties. The court,
noting an apparent close relationship between Lear and Chandler,
held that the warranty exclusion provision might be unconscionable
and denied Chandler's motion for summary judgment. 32 Similarly,
in Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E.
Enterprises, Inc. 33 the defendant operated a picnic grove and leased
from plaintiff two incinerators which never worked. Plaintiff sued
for lease payments and invoked the warranty disclaimer contained
in the lease. The court held that the disclaimer was unconscionable
in the circumstances of the case and affirmed a defendant's
verdict. 34
In Sinkoff Beverage Co., Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 35 the court
denied relief, not on the ground that the unconscionability defense
was not available to a business entity, but rather on the ground that
the contract provision was not unconscionable. 36 Sinkoff had been
the exclusive distributor for Schlitz beer in Suffolk County, New
York, for six years under a contract permitting either party to
cancel at any time. Schlitz cancelled on short notice and Sinkoff
moved to enjoin it from selling beer to anyone else in Suffolk
County, claiming that the termination-at-will provision was unconscionable. The court reviewed the background of the
relationship between the parties, held that the termination was not
unconscionable, and denied Sinkoff's motion for a preliminary
37
injunction.
A recent case in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York does indicate that the courts may
31. 55 Misc. 2d 1066, 286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
32. Electronics Corp. ofAmerica v. LearJet Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1066, __,
286 N.Y.S.2d 711,
714(Skip. Ct. 1967).
33. 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div. 1977).
34. Indostra lease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 58
A.D. 2d 482, __,
396 N.Y.S.2d 427, 427-28 (App. Div. 1977).
35.51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
36. Sinkoff Bev. Co., Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446,
-, 273 N. Y.S. 2d
364, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
37. Id. See Also County Asphalt, Inc. C. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir),
Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
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require a more egregious violation of contractual morality where
the complaining party is a large corporation. In Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., Ltd.3" the plaintiffs were parties to
distributor contracts with defendants,
United
Kingdom
corporations which controlled the applicable markets for Scotch
whiskey. Plaintiffs complained that the termination provisions in
the distributor contracts were unreasonably short and resulted from
the defendant's overwhelmingly superior bargaining power (if
plaintiffs wanted to deal in Scotch, they had to deal with
defendants). 39 The court denied relief, in holding "[t]hough a
commercial setting does not necessarily bar a claim of procedural
unconscionability, 'it is the exceptional commercial setting where a
claim of unconscionability will be allowed' [citation omitted],
particularly where the cries of unconscionability are made by large
corporations [citations omitted]. "40
4
In any event, it is clear that the defense of unconscionability '
is available to business entities engaged in commercial transactions.
II. ARBITRATION
OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY
A.

CLAIMS

OF

CONTRACT

INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

Commercial arbitration involves the resolution of businessrelated disputes outside the regular judicial structure by lay judges
who are not bound by the forms of law and whose decisions are
generally non-reviewable (except where corruption exists or as a
42
result of certain procedural errors).
Arbitration is almost always a creature of contract. 43 It is
38. 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
39. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. Ltd., 395 F. Stipp. 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
40. Id. at 233. Cf the refusal to let corporations assert the defense of usury, which comparison
was made by the court in Whitestone Credit Corp. v. Barbory Realty Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep. 176
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). It is interesting to note that Art. 138,2 of the German Civil Code, the
counterpart to U.C.C. §2-302, is commonly referred to as the usury provision of the Code although
like U.C.C. §2-302 it is much broader than the traditional concept of usury. Dawson, Unconscionable
Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1053 (1976).
41. It should be noted that U.C.C. §2-302 is purely defensive; restitution cannot be ordered by
the Court tinder that section. See Von Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd., 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380
N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct. 1976). Similarly, no damages are recoverable by the injured party tinder
u
.ti. §2-302. See Pearson v. National Budgeting Systems, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 792, 297 N.Y.S.2d 59
(1969).
42. The fullest survey of the law of commercial arbitration is
M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (1968 & Supp.). For a discussion of the law and practice of commercial arbitration,
see G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (ALI 1977). See also AMERICAN
MANAGEMENT ASsoCIATION, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES (1965).

43. There are a few mandatory arbitration statutes, and an experimental program in the federal
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possible to agree to arbitrate existing disputes in 48 states.4 4
Agreements to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable under the
laws of 35 states. 45 Where interstate, international or maritime
commerce is involved, it may also be possible to enforce an
46
agreement to arbitrate under the United States Arbitration Act.
However, certain categories of commercial disputes have been held
to be non-arbitrable, regardless of any agreement between the
parties. For example, a claim that a contract is void for usury raises
an issue for courts and not arbitrators regardless of any arbitration
47
clause contained in the agreement claimed to be usurious.
Similarly, where performance is rendered illegal by federal
48
regulation, such as price controls, arbitration is barred.
Particularly pertinent to our inquiry are those circumstances where
a contract is not claimed to be illegal but the dispute raises issues
which so impinge upon important public policies that the courts
have insisted that they retain exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Thus a serious defense under the federal securities laws 49 or the
antitrust laws 50 removes a case from arbitration, as does a claim of
patent invalidity; 51 and where the welfare of children is concerned

the courts will not relinquish their role as parens patriae to any
courts for compulsory (but non-binding) arbitration of certain disputes, but these need not concern
ts here.

44. The two states which do not allow such arbitration agreements are Oklahoma and Vermont.
45. In North Dakota an agreement to arbitrate is not specifically enforceable. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-04-12(3) (1976). In the following states an agreement to arbitrate can be enforced specifically:
ALASKA STAT. §09.43.010 (1973);

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 512-1501 (1962);

ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-

502 (1962); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §1281 (West 1972); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-22-201 (1975);CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §52-408 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §5701 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
5682.02 (Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §658-1,2 (1976); IDAHO ConE §7-901 (1979); ILL. ANN.

STAT. Ch. 10, §101 (Smith-Hurd 1975); IND. CODE §34-4-2-1 (Burns 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. §5-401
(1975);

1979);

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:4201 (West 1951);

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §5927 (Supp.,

Mo. CTS. &JUo. PRO. CODE ANN. §3-206 (1974);

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 251, §1 (Supp.

1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. §600.5001 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §572.08 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV.

STAT. §38.035 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §542:1 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:24-1 (1952);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §44-7-1 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. 57501 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §1-567.1,2 (Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2711.01 (Anderson Supp. 1978) formerly
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2711.01 (Anderson 1953); ORE. REV. STAT. §33.210,220 (1977); PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 5, §161 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §10-3-2 (Supp. 1978), Amending R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §10-3-2 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. §21-25A-1, 3 (Interim Stipp. 1978); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §8-503(b)(Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§7.04.010 (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. §298.01 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. 1-36-101 (Interim Stipp.
1977).
46.9 U.S.C. §5 1-14(1978).
47. Durst v. Abrash, 22 A.D.2d 39, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 455, 213 N.E.2d
887, 266 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965).
48. Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc. v. Eddington Fabrics Corp., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493, reh.
denied., 289 N.Y. 649, 44 N.E.2d 622 (1942).
49. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.427 (1953). But if the securities transaction involved international
commerce, arbitration may be appropriate. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, reh. denied,
419 U.S. 885 (1974).
50. Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); American
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); Aimcee Wholesale Corp.
v. Tomar Products, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
51. Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F.Skipp. 897 (S.D.N.Y 1977).
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private forum.
Arbitration may be conducted on an ad hoc basis, or before
special arbitration tribunals connected with certain industries (such
as securities and commodities), or under the auspices of the
American Arbitration Association and its subsidiary tribunals
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "AAA"). It is assumed in
this article that the subject dispute is arbitrable under the
Commerical Arbitration Rules of the AAA, although the same
considerations will often apply to arbitration before other domestic
53
arbitration tribunals.
Under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA most
disputes are heard by three arbitrators selected by the AAA in
consultation with the parties. Normally one of the arbitrators will
be selected from the claimant's industry division, one of the
arbitrators will be selected from the respondent's industry division,
and the third arbitrator will be selected from some other industry
division. In any event, all three arbitrators are deemed and
54
expected to be wholly impartial.
After hearing all of the evidence submitted by the parties,
usually at an oral hearing (although provision is made for written
submission), 55 the arbitrators render a written award. The award
identifies the parties and the contracts from which the arbitrators
derive their jurisdiction and sets forth the relief, if any, granted to
each of the parties. Written opinions giving reasons for the award
are actively discouraged by the AAA and are very rarely rendered.
Most arbitration awards are complied with voluntarily by the
parties who, after all, agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration.
Where a party refuses to comply voluntarily with the award, or
where it is desired for some other reason to reduce the award to
judgment, provision is made for the confirmation of the award in a
court of competent jurisdiction. While procedures for confirmation
vary from state to state and court to court, in general some
procedure akin to a motion for summary judgment is made
available.
52. Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966); Agur v.
Aguir, 32 A.D.2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 722 (1969), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 643, 261 N.E.2d 903,
313 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1970); Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964); Lasek v.
Lasek, 13 A.D.2d 242, 215 N.Y.S.983 (1961); Fence v. Fence, 64 Misc. 2d 480, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1016
(Family Ct. 1970); Michelman v. Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Skip. Ct. 1954).
53. No consideration is given here to arbitrations conducted Linder the auspices of the
International Chamber of Commerce or any other international tribunal.
54. There is some quiestion as to the impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators, an early form of
arbitrator-selection still commonly used in maritime charter party contracts. See, e.g., Petrol
Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
55. Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA §36 as set out in G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S
GUIDE TO COMMERCLAL ARBITRATION, Appendix A (ALl 1977).
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In any event, the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards
is very limited. For example, in 1854 the United States Supreme
Court held "[i]f the award is within the submission, and contains
the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of
the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in
law or fact. '',56
A myriad of courts, federal and state, have expressed similar
opinions,5 7 and indeed, the grounds for judicial 'vacatur of an
arbitration award are extraordinarily uniform throughout the
United States. There are in essence only four grounds for vacating
an arbitration award:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an
arbitrator and a party or his counsel affecting the arbitrator's
impartiality or appearance of impartiality;
(2) An arbitrator was corrupt;
(3) The arbitrators did not schedule or conduct the hearing in
a fairand judicious manner;
(4) The arbitrators granted relief they were not authorized to
grant under the contract pursuant to which the arbitration was
held.
In other words, the only question the courts ask is: Were the
procedural decencies respected? If the answer is yes, the award will
usually be confirmed.
B.

THE POWER OF THE ARBITRATORS

It is obvious that, if the courts are to defer the consideration of
a claim of unconscionability to arbitrators, arbitrators must have
the power to decline enforcement of unconscionable contracts or
contract provisions. There is little question that arbitrators have
such power.
Section 42 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA
provides in pertinent part that "[t]he Arbitrator may grant any
remedy or relief which he deems just and equitable and within the
56. Birchell v.Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
57. E.g., Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594
(3(d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500
F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974); Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd., 457 F.2d
387 (2d Cir. 1972); University of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132 (Alaska Sop. Ct.
1974); Smitty's Siper-Vahl, Inc. v. Pasqualetti, 22 Ariz. App. 178, 525 P.2d 309 (1974); Verdex
Steel & Constr. Co. v. Board of Sipervisors, 19 Ariz. App. 547, 509 P.2d 240 (1973); Atlas Floor
Covering v. Crescent House & Garden, Inc., 166 Cal. App. 2d 211, 333 P.2d 194 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); Trustees of Boston & Maine Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 363 Mass. 386, 294
N.E.2d 340 (1973); Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494. 62 N. E. 575 (1902); Fidickar v.Guardian Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (1873); Barlow v. Todd, 3 johns. 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of.Jtdicature 1808).
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scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to,
specific performance of a contract.' ,15
This has likewise been the holding of the courts. In a leading
1961 case the New York Court of Appeals held "[o]nce it be
ascertained that the parties broadly agreed to arbitrate a dispute
'arising out of or in connection with' the agreement, it is for the
arbitrators to decide what the agreement means and to enforce it
according to the rules of law which they deem appropriate in the
circumstances. "59
Moreover, the courts have made it clear that arbitrators have
inherent power to decline to enforce provisions they deem
unconscionable, such as a contractual exclusion of consequential
damages in a sales transaction. Indeed, this was the opinion of all
seven judges of the New York Court of Appeals in the leading case
in point. 60 Further, the courts have refused to limit the scope of an
on-going arbitration and have refused to preclude arbitrators from
considering a claim for a measure of damages expressly excluded by
the subject contract. Thus it has been held that "parties, although
purporting to be ready to proceed to arbitration, have been
insistent upon obtaining review from the court, in advance of
arbitration, of the area in which the arbitrators are to exercise their
jurisdiction. This is improper.' '61
In essence, arbitrators can award virtually any kind of
damages they deem appropriate, even where a court would be
reversed for granting such relief. Thus it has been held "it begs the
question to say that the arbitrators may award 'non-allowable'
damages. 'Non-allowable' in this context means not allowable in an
action at law as determined by the law of sales. Arbitrators are not
so confined. "62
58. Comtnercial Arbitration Roles of the AAA § 42. Seesupra note 55.
59. Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334. 174 N.E.2d 463, 464. 214 N.Y.S.2d 353,
355 (1961).
See also Spectrum Fabrics Corp. v. Main St, Fashions. Inc, 285 A.D. 710. 139
N.Y.S.2d 612, aff'd 309 N.Y. 709. 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955): Shevell v. Besen. 29 A.D. 2d 751, 287
N.Y.S.2d 340 (1968): Colletti v. Mesh. 23 A.D.2d 245. 260 N.Y.S.2d 130. aft'd,
17 NY.2d 460. 213
N.E.2d 894, 266 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1965): Bay Iron Works. Inc. v. Eisenstein, 17 A.D.2d 804, 232
N.Y.S.2d 746 (1962): Transpacific Fransp. Corp. v. Sirena Shipping Co., 9 A.D.2d 316. 193
N.Y.S.2d 277 (1959). aff'd. 8 N.Y.2d 1048. 170 N.E.2d 391,207 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1960).
60. Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen. Ltd., 25 N.Y.2d 451. 255 N.E.2d 168,
306 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969). Foutr of the judges thought the arbitrator should say in hisaward that he
was deliberately disregarding the exclusionary provision on grounds of tunconscionability while the
other three itdges thouight he shouldn't have to say anything. b t allseven ijdges agreed that the
arbitrator had tile power to refutse
to enforce the provision excl ding conse 1 crtial damages if he
'oindit tconsrcionable in the circumnistances of the case before him. Id.at 457, 255 N.E.2d at 171,
306 N.Y.S. at 939.
61. Vogel v. Simon, 13 A.D.2d 725,__+.214 N.Y.S.2d 36. 37 (1961).
62. Transpacific Transp. Corp. v. Sirena Shipping Co., 9 A.D.2d 316, 322. 193 N.Y.S.2d 277,
284(1959), aff'd 8 N.Y.2d 1048, 170 N.E.2d 391, 207 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1960).
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It is thus clear that arbitrators have the power to decline to
enforce a contractual provision, even though it is contained in the
contract from which they derive their jurisdiction, if they find it
unconscionable. The question then remains: Should a party to an
arbitration agreement be compelled to submit a claim of
unconscionability to arbitration?
C.

ARBITRATION OF CLAIMS OF CONTRACT UNCONSCIONABILITY

CASE

No. 1:

Eden Textiles, Inc. and Berkshire Sportswear Co., Inc. were
parties to two contracts pursuant to which Eden sold and Berkshire
purchased 15,100 yards of cotton fabric at a total price of
$17,365.00. The contracts covering this transaction provided forarbitration of "any controversy arising out of or relating to this
contract." Nevertheless, Berkshire commenced an action in the
New York Supreme Court against Eden claiming damages of
$35,000.00 for alleged late delivery. 6 3 Eden promptly moved to stay
the action and compel arbitration of the subject dispute.
In resisting arbitration, Berkshire argued that the contracts
between the parties contained a clause excluding consequential
damages; that Berkshire's damages were essentially conseqlential
(clearly they were so on their face, since they equialled almost
exactly twice the total purchase price of the merchandise); that in
the circumstances of the case such exclusion left Berkshire virtually
without remedy and was therefore unconscionable; that it is against
the public policy of New York State to enforce unconscionable
contract provisions; that arbitrators are not bound to follow the
law; and that, therefore, the court should first resolve the claim of
unconscionability before permitting the case to go to the

arbitrators.
The New York Supreme Court rejected this argument and
granted Eden's motion to stay the action and compel arbitration,

holding "whether or not the limitation of damages provided for is
in fact unconscionable is, to some degree, dependent upon proof of
trade usage [citations omitted]. This is an area particularly appropriate
for determinationby the arbitrator.''64
63. Berkshire Sportswear Co. v. Eden Textiles, Inc., in which the author represented the prevailing
party, was not officially reported. The decision was unofficially reported at N.Y.I..J., March 30,
1970, at 15, col. IF.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
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CASE

No. 2:

Lumbrazo v. Woodruff 5 did not involve arbitration - that is,
there was no arbitration clause in the contract between the parties
pursuant to which a quantity of Japanese onion sets were sold.
What the contract did contain was a disclaimer of any and all
warranties, including the warranty that the seeds in fact constituted
Japanese onion sets. 66 The question confronting the court was
whether such a total disclaimer was unconscionable.
It may be suspected that the trial judge who heard the evidence
and decided that the disclaimer was not unconscionable was obliged
to gain a quick education in the idiosyncracies of Japanese onion
sets, a subject which his legal training might perhaps not have
focused upon. It is likely that the five justices of the Appellate
Division who reversed (3-2) and found that the disclaimer was
unconscionable, likewise were charged with the acquisition of new
knowledge. Finally, the seven judges of the Court of Appeals who
unanimously reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the
trial judge's decision also had to spend some time on what to them
could only have been an esoteric body of knowledge.
Familiarity with the peculiarities of Japanese onion sets was
essential to the decision in tlis case for the issue turned on the
extent to which identification of Japanese onion sets could be made
through a physical inspection of the seeds. 67 If the seeds could
readily be identified as to their anticipated progeny, then it should
be unreasonable for a seller thereof to decline to be responsible for
variant progeny. If it was all guesswork, as eleven of the thirteen
judges who participated in the case evidently concluded it was, then
the seller would have been exceedingly imprudent not to disclaim
all warranties.
Commercial arbitration was not widely used a half century ago
when this case arose. Had it been, thirteen highly salaried
government officials might have been able to find a better use for
their time than studying the proclivities of Japanese onion sets for
genetic secrecy. Arbitrators, selected from among sellers, buyers
and other persons familiar with vegetable gardening would of
course have had a much easier and unquestionably less timeconsuming task.
These two cases demonstrate rather vividly the obvious
65. 256 N.Y. 92, 175 N.E. 525 (1931).
66. Lumbrazov. Wood ruff, 256 N.Y. 92,-,
67. Id. at
, 175 N.E. at 526.

175 N.E. 525, 527 (1931).
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advantage of having claims of contract unconscionability
determined by arbitrators familiar with the practices and usages of
the pertinent trade. This conclusion is reinforced by the Official
Comment to U.C.C. § 2-302 which states the basic test as
"whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particulartrade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing
68
at the time of the making of the contract. ''
It would thus appear that arbitrators are uniquely wellsituated and equipped to determine claims of contract
unconscionability. As already noted, 69 some courts have evinced
uneasiness about entrusting to arbitrators the determination of
issues involving significant public policies. Since U.C.C. § 2-302
certainly represents a legislative determination of a significant
public policy, it might be argued that this is another area, like
usury, antitrust and patents, where enforcement must be
implemented by the courts. But the rationale for excluding
arbitrators from certain categories of disputes was clearly stated by
the New York Court of Appeals in a leading case staying
arbitration of an alleged violation of New York's antitrust statute.
The court stated as follows:
Arbitrators are not bound by rules of law and their
decisions are essentially final. . . .Even if our courts were
to review the merits of the arbitrators' decision in
antitrust cases, errors may not even appear in the record
which need not be kept in any case. More important,
arbitrators are not obliged to give reasons for their rulings
or awards. Thus our courts may be called upon to enforce
arbitration awards which are directly at variance with
statutory law and judiciali decision interpreting that law.
Furthermore, there is no way to assure consistency of
interpretation or application. The same conduct could be
condemned or condoned by different arbitrators.
If the arbitrators here should decide wrongly that the
goods were or were not defective, the injustice done is
essentially only to the parties concerned. If, however,
they should proceed to decide erroneously that there was
or was not a violation of the Donnelly Act, the injury
extends to the people of the State as a whole....
68. U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment I (emphasis added).
69. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
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Thus the issue which the arbitrators will be called
upon to decide transcends the private interests of the
parties. It is not simply that arbitrators can impose
unnecessarily restrictive or lenient standards. The evil is
that, if the enforcement of antitrust policies is left in the
hands of arbitrators, erroneous decisions will have
adverse consequences for the public in general, and the
guardians of the public interest, the courts, will have no
say in the results reached.... 10
The same rationale has been enunciated by courts staying
arbitration of claims of patent invalidity.7 1 However, it is
interesting to note that this view is not universally held. For
example, of 120 federal circuit and district court Judges who
answered a questionnaire, 88 Judges (73.3 percent of the total
responding) said that they would be in favor of allowing disputes
over patent infringement and validity to be determined by
arbitration. 72 Of particular significance is the following statement
of then ChiefJudge Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit: "This patent appeal is another illustration
of the absurdity of requiring the decision of such cases to be made
by Judges whose knowledge of the relevant technology derives
primarily, or even solely, from explanations by counsel. . .. ,,73
Perhaps the distinction between the usury, anti-trust, securities fraud and patent validity cases on the one hand, and the
unconscionability cases on the other hand, is that the former tend to
involve injury to the general public while the latter usually are
limited in their impact to the parties directly involved in the case.
Where the antitrust laws are concerned, this is clearly the case,
since the satisfaction of the parties to a contract which unreasonably
restrains trade is scarcely a ground for approving it. Removing
claims of securities fraud and patent invalidity from the scope of
arbitration seems to have less justification, but it may be argued
that the public has an extraordinary interest in the integrity of the
securities markets and in the limitation of the legal monopoly
granted by patents.
Where usury is concerned a different rationale seems to be
70. Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prod., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 626-27, 237 N.E.2d 223,
225-226, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 971-972 (1968).
71. See, e.g., Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F.Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
72. Goldsmith, The Arbitration of PatentDisputes, 34 ARB.J. 28, 29 (1979).
73. General Tire and Rubber Co. v.Jefferson Chemical Co., 182 U.S.P.Q. 70 (2d Cir. 1974).
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present. As stated in the leading case on point:
Moreover, any one desiring to make a usurious
require the
agreement
impenetrable need only
necessitous borrower to consent to arbitration and also to
arbitrators by name or occupation associated with the
lending industry [citation omitted]....
If the arbitration clause device could be thus used,
all the complicated legislative distinctions in the statutes,
civil and criminal, as well as the authority of the
administrative regulating agencies, would be avoided by
the simplest draftsmanship. The welter of legislation in
this area makes clear that the concern is one of grave
public interest and not merely a regulation with respect to
74
which the immediate parties may contract freely.
There are several reasons why this rationale is either
inapplicable to claims of unconscionability or actually supports the
arbitrability of claims of unconscionability. First, the quoted
language reminds one that usury is an unusual doctrine, really sui
generis. There are indeed "complicated legislative distinctions" and
a "welter of legislation," both civil and criminal, concerning
usurious transactions. None of this pertains where the doctrine of
unconscionability is concerned.
Still more important, and indeed of the utmost significance to
our inquiry, is the concern of the court with the oppression of a
"necessitous borrower," presumably by a powerful lending
institution able to dictate terms. Obviously this takes us back to the
traditional claim of procedural unconscionability - to the welfare
recipient whose poor credit rating obliges her to do business with a
ghetto predator or the little carrot farmer obliged to do business
with the giant Campbell Soup Company and accept its preprinted
contract form or the gasoline station operator obliged to do business
with Mobil.
What the court seems to be suggesting is that the "necessitous
borrower" never gave free, knowing consent to the arbitration
clause contained in the contract claimed to be usurious. Put
another way, the court is suggesting that the "necessitous
borrower" might have been inveigled or tricked into executing the
agreement containing the arbitration clause. But if such be the
74. Durst v. Abrash, 22 A.D.2d 39, 44, 253 N.Y.S.2d 351, 355-356 (1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d
445, 213 N.E.2d 887, 266 N.Y.S.2d806(1965).
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case, there is no reason to reach the issue of usury, for it is
universally held that a party will not be compelled to arbitrate
unless he has knowingly and explicitly agreed to arbitrate.7 5 Where
a party freely gave his consent to arbitration of all disputes "arising
out of or relating to" the subject contract (the standard language
for arbitration clauses), it is destructive of the arbitral process for
the courts to become involved in delineating the issues and deciding
which should go to the arbitrators and which should first be
determined by the courts. The duplication of effort, with the
attending ills of added delay and expense, is obvious. Even more
important is the undermining of the authority of the arbitrators
whose function may well be reduced to mere calculators of
damages. This was expressly recognized by the dissenting judges in
the Durst case, who wrote the following:
In very many instances the question of whether the
instrument is legally enforcible or not depends on the
interpretation to be put on it and this, in turn, depends
most frequently on subsidiary issues of fact. The
resolution of these issues determines the right to recovery.
It is just those issues that the parties agreed to submit to
arbitrators. If these issues are to be determined by the
court, the role of the arbitrators is written out of the
contract, or at least reduced to a calculation of damages. 7 6
There is another very good reason why the courts should not
become involved in claims of contract unconscionability as a
preliminary to compelling arbitration of a dispute under a contract
providing for arbitration of all disputes. A claim that a contract is
usurious can normally be assessed with relative ease. Whether a
contract is violative of the anti-trust laws is admittedly more
complicated. However, in response to that very fact, the courts
have required a rather conspicuous antitrust violation before
permitting a party to avoid his contractual commitments on that
account. Thus the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has held that "antitrust defenses are allowed only in cases
where the intrinsic illegality of the contract is so clear that
enforcement would make a court party to the precise conduct
forbidden by the law." 7 7
75. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Dotighboy
Industries, Inc. v. Pantasote Co., 17 A.D.2d 216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962). Cf, Marlene Industries
Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 380 N.E.2d 239, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1978).
76. 22 A.D.2d at 46, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 357-358.
77. Dickstein v. du Pont, 443 F.2d 783, 786(Ist Cir. 1971).
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For the same reason, courts should be loath to go behind the
contract and hear evidence of the specific circumstances of the
parties as well as trade usage in order to determine, as a
preliminary to arbitration, whether any of the provisions in the
contract providing for arbitration might be unconscionable. As
recently stated by the New York Court of Appeals, "the courts
must be able to examine an arbitration agreement or an award on
its face, without engaging in extended factfinding or legal analysis,
and conclude that public policy precludes its enforcement." 8 This
quote is taken from a case in which the court upheld an arbitrator's
enforcement of a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement
although the court clearly implied that it disagreed with the result
and might even reverse a comparable judicial determination.
One final consideration. In the preface to this article it is noted
that a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit dissented from a decision sending the issue of
unconscionability to an arbitration panel on the ground that
U.C.C. § 2-302 begins "If the court as a matter of law finds ..
This dissenting judge also noted that the issue could not be
submitted to a jury.7 9 The answer to this objection is that the judge
seems to be misconstruing the role of the arbitrator as analogous to
that of a civil jury. In fact, as a myriad of cases make clear, an
arbitrator's function is rather analogous to that of a judge sitting
without a jury. Thus it is regularly held that "[b]oth questions of
fact and law are for the arbitrators. "
CONCLUSION
The inadequacy of court litigation for the resolution of
commercial disputes is a reality known to most businessmen. Long
delays are common, great expense is inevitable. Every successful
litigator has heard a client express admiration for his advocacy
skills while remarking that one additional such victory will find him
in the bankruptcy courts.
Commercial arbitration holds out to the businessman the
possibility of an expeditious and relatively inexpensive resolution of
his disputes with his suppliers and his customers. He can expect,
for example, that a dispute over the ownership of seasonal
78. Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 631, 389 N.E.2d 456, 460, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 978
(1979).
79. See, n. 6 supra.
80. Spectrum Fabrics Corp. v. Main St. Fashions, 285 A.D. 710, 139 N.Y.S.2d 612, 617, aff'd,
309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955). Andsee case cited supra note 65.

CONTRACT UNCONSCIONABILITY

merchandise will be resolved while that merchandise is still
merchantable. And he may anticipate that the stccessfill
prosecution of his claim, or the sUccessful interposition of a defense
to a claim brought against him, will not be so expensive as to rmake
a victory Pyrrhic or a defense uneconomical.
But the advantages of arbitration will be dissipated or even
wholly lost if the parties become embroiled in preliminary or
ancillary judicial proceedings. Indeed, if the couirts are going to
receive evidence and make factual determinations and legal
conclusions which will be binding upon the arbitrators, one might
just as well dispense with the arbitrators and let the courts finish the
job they have begun. Indeed, a proceeding which involves an initial
court determination of such an issue as whether a contract
provision is unconscionable, followed by an arbitration hearing to
determine whatever there is still left over to determine, followed by
a contested motion to confirm the award, may well be more
consuming of time and money than a straightforward litigation
would be. Combining litigation and arbitration generally accords
one the major disadvantages of both.
There may be certain areas where matters of such immense
public importance are at stake that their resolution cannot be left to
tribunals not bound to follow the rules of law. Antitrust
enforcement is the most obviouIs such area and perhaps the courts
are correct that issues of usury, securities fraud, and the validity of
patents must likewise be determined by judges bound to follow the
law and subject to judicial review of their decisions. Btt if the
arbitration of commercial disputes is to be encouraged - and
everyone who speaks on the subject, from the Chief justice of the
United States on down, has said that it should be -- then it is
extremely important to keep the non-arbitrable categories as
limited and narrow as possible. For the reasons aclumbrated in this
article a claim of contract unconscionability should certainly not be
inchlded within the non-arbitrable categories; rather, it constitutes
precisely the kind ofdisptute which arbitrators are ideally situated to
resolve quickly and fairly.

